Monetary Union, Banking Union and Capital Markets Union are deeply intertwined. In this speech at a Conference organised by the European University Institute, FBF, Florence 25th April 2019, I attempt to justify why a European safe asset is a linchpin of the three projects. None of them can reach a smooth and full completion without it. Member States and European policy makers must now take seriously the creation of such vital component of the European financial architecture
A slide presentation on November 5th 2018 on a topical issue. It provides an overview of what the Euro Area would need to face the next economic downturn, whenever it comes…
In October 2018 I delivered the Robert Mundell Annual Lecture at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), The John Hopkins University in Bologna. I addressed the connection between the theory of Optimal Currency Areas and the evolution of the euro area by organising my exposition around three questions: 1) What was the role of the OCA theory in influencing the European monetary union initial design; 2) Does the OCA theory help to explain the reasons for the difficulties encountered by the euro area or are other narratives necessary?; 3) and finally, what advice does the theory provide about initiatives to improve the euro area stability and robustness.
This is my farewell speech at the end of my mandate as the ECB Vice President in May 2018. I addressed the problems with the initial design of Monetary Union, the challenges it is facing and the reforms necessary to improve its efficiency and robustness.
A text from May 2018 defending the need for a real Capital Markets Union, a project that has been neglected by European authorities
An old text from 2013, later published in the Journal of Macroecnomics 39 (2014) 250-259, about a reinterpretation of the European crisis. it has been read and quoted over the years. I debunk the view that fiscal policy was the culprit, and draw attention to the banking sectors of core and peripheral countries, responsible for financing
the credit boom that created the imbalances and vulnerabilities that later were at the centre
of the crisis. The increase of debt ratios in the periphery until 2007 was more significant for the private sector than for the public sector. The crisis has been as much a banking crisis as a sovereign debt crisis and to avoid similar future risks a European Supervisor and a Resolution
Authority are essential.
An old text from 2011 but that has been read and quoted, about contagion in the early days of the sovereign debt crisis. It reports on work done at the ECB to identify with several methods the real contagion effects of the Greek crisis and the discussions about debt restructuring. It shows the contagion effects on Portugal, Spain, Italy and a even a slight impact on France.
In November 2010 I addressed the challenges for economic governance related to economic growth and macroeconomic imbalances. I concluded referring to the ongoing reform of financial regulation, with some observations on the role of Europe in global governance and what it means to be European at this point in time.