In a speech on May 4th 2018, I analysed the past and future of ECB´s monetary policy. I distinguished four phases in past policy, portraying the ECB evolution from an almost monetarist central bank to a modern one. I discuss the present challenges, criticize the concept of the so-called “natural rate of unemployment”, the problems with the Phillips curve and possible changes to the monetary framework of major central banks, a subject I address in another text in more detail.

This is my farewell speech at the end of my mandate as the ECB Vice President in May 2018. I addressed the problems with the initial design of Monetary Union, the challenges it is facing and the reforms necessary to improve its efficiency and robustness.

A text from May 2018 at the ECB and its Watchers Annual Meeting. I address the issue of monetary policy not being suitable to address serious financial stability concerns and why macroprudential tools are essential for that purpose. Following Lars Svensson methodology, the text shows an empirical application to the euro area, illustrating the costs of using monetary policy for financial stability purposes. Only in extreme circumstances should monetary policy be used to contain financial instability concerns.

This text from 2015 is different from all others I wrote while at the ECB. It was delivered at the inauguration of the Jewish Memorial created at the ECB new building. The structure on which it was built served during nazi times as a departure station for Jews being taken to extermination camps. The text is a philosophical reflection on evil represented by nazism, and on the history of Europe and the rebirth of its better values embeded in the European Union.

An old text from 2013, later published in the Journal of Macroecnomics 39 (2014) 250-259, about a reinterpretation of the European crisis. it has been read and quoted over the years. I debunk the view that fiscal policy was the culprit, and draw attention to the banking sectors of core and peripheral countries, responsible for financing
the credit boom that created the imbalances and vulnerabilities that later were at the centre
of the crisis. The increase of debt ratios in the periphery until 2007 was more significant for the private sector than for the public sector. The crisis has been as much a banking crisis as a sovereign debt crisis and to avoid similar future risks a European Supervisor and a Resolution
Authority are essential.

An old text from 2011 but that has been read and quoted, about contagion in the early days of the sovereign debt crisis. It reports on work done at the ECB to identify with several methods the real contagion effects of the Greek crisis and the discussions about debt restructuring. It shows the contagion effects on Portugal, Spain, Italy and a even a slight impact on France.